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I AM CERTAIN to make some enemies here before the evening 
is over, so I might as well get started. Despite my respect for 
church-related schools, including Lutheran schools, the schools 
of the Christian Reformed Church, and even the parochial 
school system mandated by the Third Plenary Council of 1884, 
and despite my strong conviction that parents have every right to 
educate their children anywhere they please (including at home), 
I am—and I have been for nearly half a century—a passionate 
advocate for public education at the elementary, junior high, and 
high school level. Public schools, originally known as “common 
schools” in the nineteenth century, may be the only place in our 
society where children from various racial, ethnic, and religious 
backgrounds can come together and, in the context of both 
the classroom and the playground, learn to get along with one 
another in at least a measure of comity. That sounds to me like 
a recipe for democracy, and it is one that has served us well for 
most of American history.
Although I acknowledge that what I have just described is 
an ideal view, and that public education is in real trouble today, 
I prefer to view the glass as half full rather than half empty. 
We need a place in America where children drawn from differ-
ent backgrounds can meet on a more-or-less equal footing and 
learn the rudiments of democracy. Public schools, for all their 
faults, provide that space. I worry very much that sending Jewish 
children to Jewish schools, Catholic kids to parochial schools, 
evangelical kids to Christian schools (or home schooling), and the 
children of affluent parents to elite private schools leads inevitably 
to a further Balkanization of American society, which cannot help 
but have deleterious effects. I believe that if we, as a society, care 
anything about the future of democracy, especially in a pluralistic 
context, we cannot afford to give up on public education.
I realize full well the implications of what I am saying for 
people of faith. It means, at the very least, that parents and 
churches have to bear more of the responsibility for the religious 
formation of their children. That’s not a simple task, especially in 
the context of a media-saturated, peer-driven society. And I also 
recognize the ways in which religious schools—whether they be 
Jewish, Lutheran, Catholic, or Christian Reformed—have safe-
guarded the ethnic identity and particularity of specific popula-
tions. That is not a negligible consideration, and I acknowledge 
its importance. I first became aware of this when I studied the 
religious dynamics in colonial New York City. The Collegiate 
School, which is still in operation on the upper west side of 
Manhattan, was founded by the Dutch Reformed Church 
in 1628. Shortly after the English Conquest of 1664, Trinity 
Church, a congregation of the Church of England, established 
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“Parents and churches have to bear more 
of the responsibility for the religious 
formation of their children.”
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Religious Diversity
I conclude as promised, by turning to the question of religious 
diversity in colleges and universities. To focus the present discus-
sion, I will set aside several very important questions and issues. 
First, I focus here on religious diversity rather than on other 
issues of diversity. At my college, for example, the question of 
racial diversity is a pressing matter of ongoing concern and atten-
tion. From the point of view of Lutheran (or Christian) identity, 
it seems to me that the theoretical reasons for valuing and pursu-
ing such diversity are evident; the hard part (for isolated colleges 
in the land of Norwegians) is strategy for achieving and preserv-
ing it. Religious diversity, on the other hand, is easy to achieve 
(maybe too easy), but its theoretical support, or its compatibility 
with robust and particular religious identity may be less clear.
Next, in focusing on a religiously diverse faculty, I set aside 
for now the religious composition of the student body and of 
administrative boards, etc. I hope that the applicability of ideas 
expressed so far to wider constituencies will be plain, but to 
the extent that it is not—or that different considerations are 
relevant—I leave that work for another occasion.
Finally, I want to acknowledge that some schools very clearly 
and narrowly define the range of faculty religious diversity which 
is compatible with their religious identity and academic mission. 
Here I have in mind those schools whose faculty positions are 
open only to members of the founding denomination, or to schol-
ars who hold a specified range of theological views. In articulating 
a model for a wider range of faculty diversity, I want to be clear in 
saying that I don’t intend to imply that more restrictive models 
are less consistent or desirable. I myself am a graduate of Wheaton 
College, and I consider Wheaton (and Calvin, so as not to appear 
entirely self-serving) to be an example of religious and academic 
integrity, and of exemplary academic excellence. Others disagree, 
of course, (see Kenneth Wagner’s “Faith Statements Do Restrict 
Academic Freedom” in Academe, January-February 2006, and 
responses in that themed issue) but that too is an argument for 
another day. For now, I only want to resist that notion that colleges 
and universities must choose between adopting the Wheaton/
Calvin model or abandoning substantive Christian identity.  
There are strands of that way of thinking on my own campus—
proponents of the opposing choices all being dubious (at best) 
that we can long maintain a strong Lutheran identity and a reli-
giously diverse faculty. I am arguing that there is more than one 
model for a strong and thoroughgoing Lutheran or Christian 
institutional identity in church-related colleges and universities, 
including models with religiously diverse faculties.
I hope that at least some elements of the model I propose 
will be evident already. Lutherans and many other brands of 
Christians may—because of their religious commitments—be 
inclined to academic virtues, and if those commitments inform 
the ethos of the school, the institution will encourage good peda-
gogy, interdisciplinary engagement, and academic freedom. So 
it’s great to have plenty of Lutherans (or relevant other brands) 
around. But the question of religious diversity is, what about 
having others around?
One sort of response to the question goes by the name of “crit-
ical mass” theory. The idea is that if you have enough Lutherans 
(etc.) around to keep the ethos and identity strong, you can have 
some others and the benefits they bring without bringing the 
house down. I guess it is obvious that Lutheran identity is going 
to require having Lutherans (or suitable substitutes) around, but 
I’m a little uneasy about tendencies of some versions of critical 
mass theories. To be specific, I’m uneasy because they focus more 
on the mass than on the rest of the faculty. The problem is that 
faculty with other religious commitments, in some sort of free-
rider status, may be at best indifferent and at worst threatened by 
the mission and identity of the school. In practice, younger col-
leagues in this situation duck and run when talk about mission 
and identity comes up, and others may gather resources and allies 
to resist or subvert such talk and its object. I don’t know if that’s 
the kind of fun you want to have in promoting or preserving 
institutional identity, but it’s not the only option.
Here I’ll suggest that the resources of the Lutheran tradition 
for promoting our highest academic aspirations are of central 
importance in conceiving of a vibrant, mission-oriented, and 
religiously diverse faculty. First of all, why might those principles 
promote a diverse faculty? Because Lutherans’ commitment to 
search for truth, to critique all perspectives (even their own), 
and to nurture creative imagination is served by the presence 
and active engagement of opposing ideas, presented by smart 
and articulate people who themselves are committed to the 
mission. Fine, but how can others be committed to the mission 
if, for example, they are not Lutheran or Christian? Well, they 
have their own reasons for being committed to the academic 
and pedagogical virtues (if they don’t have reasons or don’t have 
those commitments would you hire them even if you didn’t care 
about religious identity?). Chances are, nobody told them in grad 
“Lutherans’ commitment to search for 
truth, to critique all perspectives (even 
their own), and to nurture creative imag-
ination is served by the presence and 
active engagement of opposing ideas.”
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The necessity to acknowledge uncertainty, however, should 
not be considered an external restraint on the Christian religious 
tradition as personally or institutionally expressed. The notion of 
human weakness—including epistemic weakness—is as central 
to Christianity as any idea. Allow me to return to Richard 
Hughes for an eloquent expression of this academic implication 
of the doctrine of human finitude:
This position means that every scholar must always confess 
that he or she could be wrong. Apart from this confession, 
there can be no serious life of the mind, for only when we 
confess that we might be wrong can we engage in the kind 
of conversation that takes seriously other voices. And only 
when we confess that we might be wrong are we empow-
ered to assess in critical ways our own theories, our own 
judgments, and our own understandings (86-7).
It is especially pertinent for the present discussion that Hughes 
cites this doctrine and its implications as a particular contribution 
of the Lutheran tradition to the life of the mind. Since the pos-
sibility of being mistaken is an important motive to free inquiry 
in the pursuit of truth, such inquiry ought to be a hallmark of the 
Lutheran tradition, and to its institutions of learning.
Thus the Christian tradition, and by extension associated 
learning institutions, have internal reasons for allowing free 
discussion and questioning—even of their own basic truth-
claims. But this is not the only motive for actively encouraging 
open inquiry. It is not merely to the extent that one might be 
mistaken that one ought to welcome questioning, but also 
to the extent that one is confident of the truth of one’s com-
mitments. This point also reiterates Mill, who held that the 
highest intellectual ideal is not just to hold true beliefs, but to 
hold them in a certain way. His summary of the argument in 
On Liberty is this:
Even if the received opinion be...the whole truth; unless it 
be suffered to be, and actually is, vigorously and earnestly 
contested, it will...be held in the manner of a prejudice, with 
little comprehension or feeling of its rational grounds. And 
not only this, but...the meaning of the doctrine itself will 
be lost or enfeebled, and deprived of its vital effect on the 
character and conduct (50).
Free inquiry serves the truth, then, regardless of the status of the 
received opinion or tradition. Truth is served by the questioning 
of false received opinion for obvious reasons. Truth is served by 
free questioning of partially correct received opinion because 
the true is thereby winnowed from the false. And, finally, even 
wholly true opinions benefit from rigorous questioning since the 
vitality of our understanding and use of the truth is enhanced. 
The familiar argument for absolute freedom of inquiry and 
expression in the second chapter of On Liberty seems to be an 
elaboration of the claims implicit in the AAUP’s Statement 
on academic freedom, since Mill’s argument depends crucially 
upon truth-seeking. To the extent, therefore, that Christian 
religious commitment is genuinely characterized by truth-seek-
ing, it is wholly congenial to promoting rigorous free discussion 
and inquiry, both as advocated by a key founder of the modern 
liberal tradition, and as defended by the primary American aca-
demic organization for promoting and protecting free inquiry. 
If Christian scholars or Christian institutions are perceived as 
being at odds with that tradition or the goals of that organiza-
tion, they should respond by vigorously emphasizing—in profes-
sion and in practice—the common commitment to truth.
Here I would like to acknowledge again that not all institutions 
with strong Christian commitment put this theory into practice 
(hence the preceding exhortation). But I would also like to say that 
this theoretical account is more than an apologetic exercise—a 
way of reconciling Christian commitment and academic freedom. 
To a greater degree than some may realize, the philosophical 
foundations for the AAUP’s paradigmatic defense of academic 
freedom have been challenged, and in some circles abandoned. 
Commitment to those academic standards may depend far more 
upon social convention in the academy than upon theoretical 
foundations. People defend academic freedom because that’s just 
the way we do things. Philosopher Richard Rorty has argued that 
this reliance upon convention is sufficient support for academic 
freedom. I disagree. I’m not sure that convention and tradition is a 
strong enough foundation, and unlike Rorty I think that theoreti-
cal justification is possible. This is part—an instance really—of a 
larger debate in contemporary political theory about the viability 
of classical liberalism (Mill being a key figure in this tradition). 
The details of that argument are better left for another occasion. 
I will observe, however, that if Christian commitment can be a 
theoretical foundation for principles of academic freedom, and if 
those principles do turn out to be in need of theoretical support, 
then the considerations above may show again that our institu-
tions can exhibit their academic integrity because of—not merely 
in spite of—religious identity.
“The possibility of being mistaken is an 
important motive to free inquiry.”
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Trinity School. The fortunes of the Collegiate School suffered 
thereafter so that by the middle of the eighteenth century, the 
Dutch congregation appealed to the ecclesiastical authorities in 
the Netherlands for an English-speaking minister; the younger 
generation, educated at Trinity School, could no longer under-
stand the Dutch language.
Such is the power of education in transmitting both faith and 
culture. I acknowledge that, and I honor its importance. Still, 
despite these considerations, I stand by my defense of public 
education, while, at the same time, I support the prerogative of 
parents to educate their children in any venue they see fit.
Having said that, and although it may sound counterintui-
tive, I am equally committed to the importance of Christian 
higher education. Some of this, I realize, is autobiographical. I 
grew up in parsonages in rural Minnesota, Michigan, and Iowa, 
where I attended public schools—and I happen to think that 
I am none the worse for wear. For college, however, I went to a 
Christian liberal arts college and had there (on balance) a won-
derful experience, and it is on that experience that I should like 
to focus the balance of my remarks this evening.
A few more autobiographical details—of necessity, I’m afraid. 
I very nearly didn’t attend college at all; I had started a small 
business as a teenager, and I was convinced at the time that this 
was what I wanted to pursue as a career. My father, however, 
urged me to think about higher education. Finally I agreed, first, 
to attend a state university within commuting distance so that I 
could continue operating my business. Then, succumbing to a bit 
more pressure, I relented and submitted a last-minute applica-
tion to Trinity College in the North Shore suburbs of Chicago.
The decision to attend college was, I see now, the first of many 
Robert Frost moments in my life, where I stood at the fork in the 
yellow woods and contemplated two pathways, both of which 
seemed agreeable at the time. I have occasionally reflected on 
“The Road Not Taken,” and I imagine that, all things con-
sidered, I probably chose the better route. And what if I had 
chosen the state university? All of this is speculation, of course, 
but I suspect that, given my rootedness in evangelicalism, I 
would have burrowed deeper into the subculture, this vast and 
interlocking network of congregations, denominations, Bible 
camps, Bible institutes, mission societies, and publishing houses 
that was constructed in earnest during the middle decades of the 
twentieth century to protect innocents like me from the depre-
dations of the larger world, a world that my parents believed was 
both corrupt and corrupting.
There is safety within the evangelical subculture, I’ll not deny 
it—or any religious subculture, for that matter. My religious 
upbringing—in the home, at church and youth group and 
Sunday school, at vacation Bible school, and Bible camp—had 
provided me with a firm grounding in the faith, and I might  
very comfortably have remained safely within the bosom of  
the subculture.
Instead, I attended a Christian liberal arts college, one sup-
ported by my own denomination. Like many such institutions, 
it began as a Bible institute, but it evolved, as these schools often 
do, into an accredited four-year college. (It now bears the rather 
grand moniker of Trinity International University—having 
passed, apparently, on Trinity Intergalactic University!)
Soon after I shambled onto campus in early September 
1972, I recognized that Trinity was an unusual place, at least 
by the standards of Christian higher education. A wise and 
forward-looking dean had hired a cohort of young, energetic, 
newly-minted PhDs who challenged the presuppositions of their 
students, most of whom hailed from politically and theologically 
conservative households. But they did so not as provocateurs but 
as fellow-travelers, and they did so not with the intention of rob-
bing us of our faith altogether. As a student, as someone whose 
notion of rebellion was to wear blue jeans to the Sunday-evening 
service, the experience of probing the parameters of the faith and 
questioning the shibboleths of the subculture was unsettling. 
But it was also bracing, and it changed me in ways that even 
now, in late middle age, I appreciate only in part.
Beginning with the publication of the first edition of 
Mine Eyes Have Seen the Glory: A Journey into the Evangelical 
Subculture in America (1989), I’ve heard from dozens of people 
over the years who were reared evangelical but who left the faith, 
many of them in late adolescence. Their letters are poignant, 
even plaintive. They reminisce, page after single-spaced page, 
about their religious background—Sunday school and sing-
ing songs around the campfire. They express appreciation for 
their upbringing and sadness for having left the faith. Some left 
because of intellectual doubts or because of sexual orientation 
or because of what they perceived as hypocrisy in the ranks of 
the religious leadership. More recently, I hear utter disgust at the 
ways in which the leaders of the Religious Right have delivered 
the faith captive to right-wing politics. 
Finally, these correspondents express a kind of envy of some-
one who has been able to retain his faith. For some, those who 
perceive me as an intellectual, the fact that I teach at a presti-
gious university deepens the conundrum because they assume, I 
guess, that no one with academic credentials can simultaneously 
be an advocate for the faith.
I respond carefully to these letters, and I acknowledge that 
even a college sophomore can explain faith away as hysteria 
or delusion or the search for a father figure. Then I gener-
ally explain my decision years ago that I would not allow the 
canons of Enlightenment rationalism be the final arbiter of 
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truth. I elect to inhabit an enchanted universe where there are 
forces at work beyond my understanding or control. I wouldn’t 
live anywhere else.
I don’t know whether or not my testimony is compelling, but 
I’ve come to reflect on why it is that I’ve been able to retain the 
faith when so many of my contemporaries have lost or discarded 
theirs. I suspect that, as with all such matters, a variety of fac-
tors come into play, but I have to believe that my formation at a 
Christian liberal arts college was crucial. Trinity College was far 
from perfect, but I think the place struck the right balance in a 
number of ways.
First, I think that any such institution faces the challenge of 
navigating between the Scylla of secularism and the Charybdis 
of sectarianism—although I think that channel is wider than is 
commonly believed. I heard a lot of rhetoric about “the integra-
tion of faith and learning” when I was an undergraduate—a lot 
of rhetoric. It was an effective mantra, a comforting piety, but I 
was never exactly sure what it meant, nor do I know today. 
The dangers inherent in such pieties are obvious, and they 
have been amply illustrated in recent years in the calls for a kind 
of repristinization of America’s educational institutions. Yale is 
no longer a safe haven for Congregationalists, the lament goes, or 
Princeton for Presbyterians. No one will argue that many of the 
nation’s élite institutions of higher education are still the “nurser-
ies of piety” that their founders intended. But the accompanying 
argument that people of faith should be granted special pleading 
in the academy is, to say the least, suspect. I will never contend 
that the academy is a perfect meritocrary—I have my own quiver 
of anecdotes and more than a few bruises to refute that—but 
people of faith need to play by the same rules and abide by the 
same standards of academic scholarship as everyone else.
For example, as a person of faith and as a historian of religion 
in America, I believe that the hand of God was present in the 
event historians call the Great Awakening, a revival of piety that 
swept along the Atlantic seaboard in the 1730s and 1740s. When 
I teach the Great Awakening, however, or when I write about 
the topic, I describe the historical, social, and cultural circum-
stances that gave rise to the Great Awakening, and I quote the 
perceptions of contemporaries that it was an event of super-
natural inspiration. But for me to attribute the revival solely to 
divine providence would be to default on my responsibilities as 
a historian.
Or, to take another recent example, consider the case for 
intelligent design, a topic I cover extensively in Thy Kingdom 
Come. For that chapter, I framed the issue by describing a 
debate at Princeton University between Lee Silver, a molecular 
biologist at Princeton, and William Dembski, a kind of high 
priest of intelligent design and the chief evangelist for the intel-
ligent design movement. I made it clear in my narrative that, 
as a person of faith, I happen to believe in intelligent design 
(or something very close to it), although I confess that I’ve 
grown accustomed over the years to referring to the “intelligent 
designer” simply as “God.” I rehearsed Dembski’s very impres-
sive academic credentials and suggested that, although I laid no 
claims to being a theologian or a philosopher, he struck me as a 
very competent theologian and philosopher. But the issue is the 
validity of Dembski’s assertion that intelligent design is science 
and therefore should be taught in the science classroom.
If he means to be a scientist, Dembski should be prepared to 
make his case as a scientist and not angle for special pleading, 
as he did in the debate at Princeton. He argued, in effect, that 
because he is a person of faith he should therefore be exempted 
from the mores of inquiry peculiar to the discipline he claims 
as his own. As I emphasized in the chapter, I have no objec-
tions whatsoever to the teaching of intelligent design in col-
leges or universities; in fact, one of my PhD students, with my 
blessing, taught a course in intelligent design at Columbia this 
past summer. But the appropriate venue for such inquiry is the 
religion classroom or the philosophy seminar—at least until 
Dembski or someone can make a case that intelligent design is 
science. (Even the judge in the Dover, Pennsylvania, intelligent 
design case, a George W. Bush appointee, found this claim 
ludicrous. By peddling their theological claims as science, 
Dembski and the intelligent design advocates seek a double 
standard: “Hey look, I’m a scientist! I don’t do any of the 
things that other scientists do, I refuse to submit my work for 
peer review, I don’t ask the same questions that other scientists 
ask, and I don’t want to play by the rules of scientific inquiry, 
but, trust me, I’m a scientist!”  
That, I submit, is no way to integrate faith and learning. It 
fails to abide by the professional standards of the academy, and, 
more important, it demeans the faith because it suggests that 
faith needs the imprimatur of science in order to be valid. I 
emphatically reject that notion.
If that sort of intellectual dishonesty represents the 
Charybdis of sectarianism, the Scylla of secularism at institu-
tions of Christian higher education is a kind of intellectual 
arrogance that is allergic to expressions of piety. I understand 
this aversion, especially because I grew up within evangelicalism, 
where piety tends too often toward the rote and formulaic. I too 
participated in this cult of intellectualism, especially in graduate 
school—a reaction, no doubt, to my upbringing.
Engendering spirituality and encouraging piety is a tricky 
business, and I’ve never trusted institutions with this task. 
Institutions, in fact, are remarkably poor vessels of piety, in my 
experience; they tend to quash it more often than abet it, so 
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Note that, if the religious commitment of the institution is 
just lip-service, if the core questions are seen as imposed on some 
by others, or if those questions are widely considered irrelevant 
to subjects of substantive academic inquiry, then this particular 
academic benefit is very unlikely to result. It seems in this case, 
then, that the more substantive the religious commitment, the 
greater the academic benefit. Substantive religious commitment in 
an institution means, in part, a faculty and administration which 
take the core questions of the tradition seriously. Note also that 
respect for these questions and attention to them do not imply an 
imposed consensus about their answers. In fact, the goal of inte-
grating a course of academic study around key common questions 
would seem to be served by the broadest possible range of perspec-
tives on the questions. This is a key consideration in the matter of 
religious diversity, to which I will return below. Before ending the 
discussion of religious identity and academic integrity, however, 
the crucial issue of academic freedom must be addressed.
Academic Integrity: Free Inquiry
I won’t beat around the bush about this. One of the reasons why 
we have to talk about academic freedom in this context (and one 
of the reasons why apprehension about religion and the acad-
emy may be well-founded) is a very real history of abuse of this 
principle by religiously-affiliated colleges and universities—in 
the name of their religious identity. It is by no means the case 
that only religious institutions, or that all religious institutions, 
have violated this principle. Nor is it true, in my view, that 
every religious restriction is an unjustified or abusive violation 
of academic freedom. It is nevertheless the case that religiously-
based violations of academic freedom too often occur. Some 
think that, for this reason alone, religious commitment must 
be considered a threat to the academic integrity of educational 
institutions. I don’t think that’s true, and I’ll say why in terms of 
(at least one version of) Christian commitment.
The preeminent banner under which academic freedom is 
promoted in the United States is the American Association of 
University Professors’ 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic 
Freedom and Tenure. Justification for policies urged in the docu-
ment is offered, in part, as follows:
Institutions of higher education are conducted for the 
common good and not to further the interest of either 
the individual teacher or the institution as a whole. The 
common good depends upon the free search for truth and 
its free exposition.
Academic freedom is essential to these purposes and 
applies to both teaching and research. Freedom in research 
is fundamental to the advancement of truth. Academic 
freedom in its teaching aspect is fundamental for the 
protection of the rights of the teacher in teaching and of 
the student to freedom in learning. 
The 1940 Statement advocates academic freedom on grounds 
that the principle is crucial to the search for truth. I want to 
make it clear that this line of justification for free inquiry does 
not put it at odds with Christian commitment. Insofar as 
principles of free inquiry aid the pursuit of truth, scholars and 
institutions committed to the Christian tradition should be vig-
orous advocates for academic freedom—given the importance of 
truth-seeking to that tradition.
For the sake of brevity, I will not make even a cursory attempt 
to survey or explain the role of truth-seeking in the Christian 
tradition. Allow me simply to represent this long-standing (even if 
recently underemphasized) aspect of the tradition with Cardinal 
Newman’s claim from The Idea of A University that “Truth...is the 
main object of Religion.” (Discourse II.5) This will suffice because 
the phrase not only represents Christian truth-seeking but is also 
likely to incite just the sort of suspicion that we are undertaking to 
address. Why is it that academically-inclined people get nervous 
when Christians start talking about truth?
One reason (and here we might go all the way back to the 
notorious—even if abused—example of Galileo) is that authori-
tative professions to have the truth can be taken as grounds to 
stop looking for it, or asking questions, or listening to others. 
Since this attitude has too commonly accompanied strong 
religious commitment (both in- and outside the academy) it has 
undoubtedly encouraged widespread resistance to the notion of 
truth being “the main object of religion,” and a corresponding 
lack of appreciation for Christianity’s conceptual capacity to 
undergird principles and policies of academic freedom.
Nevertheless, an attitude which impedes the search for truth 
because truth has already been found fails to take sufficient 
account of uncertainty. Mill makes this point in his classic 
argument for free expression: “All silencing of discussion,” he 
writes in On Liberty, “is an assumption of infallibility” (17). To 
shut off questioning or the airing of alternative views on grounds 
that the truth is known is—given the assumption that the truth 
is important—implicitly to claim certainty. (Mill points out 
that even the practical considerations which may require an end 
of discussion are served by prior open inquiry.) Certainty is, of 
course, a vanishingly rare commodity if taken to refer to the 
impossibility of being mistaken rather than to mere strength of 
conviction, and thus the consideration is a compelling one. 
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Others have articulated this more elegantly and in more 
detail than I can pretend here, and I’ll refer to just a couple of 
familiar examples. Almost fifteen years ago, Mark Schwehn 
described how spiritual virtues are indispensable to academic 
inquiry and emphasized the role of Christian communities of 
learning in Exiles from Eden: Religion and the Academic Vocation 
in America. More recently, Richard Hughes has elaborated how 
Christian faith can sustain the life of the mind in his book of 
that title. Hughes claims that “a scholar’s Christian faith can 
express itself in the highest and finest kind of scholarship—a 
scholarship committed to search for truth, to engage a variety 
of conversation partners, to critique all perspectives, even one’s 
own, and to nurture creative imagination” (11). When (appro-
priately for our present discussion) he focuses on the Lutheran 
tradition as a whole, Hughes has this to say:
The truth is, the Lutheran tradition possesses some of the 
most potent theological resources for sustaining the life 
of the mind that one can imagine. It encourages dialogue 
between the Christian faith and the world of ideas, fosters 
intellectual humility, engenders a healthy suspicion of 
absolutes, and helps create a conversation in which all 
partners are taken seriously (93).
On the subject of teaching and pedagogy, I need only mention 
the familiar work of Parker Palmer. Though much of this work is 
not explicitly Christian or religious, I agree with both Schwehn 
and Hughes that all of it is deeply and substantively rooted in 
Palmer’s Quaker heritage. A more explicit illustration from a 
colleague at a Lutheran college is Lendol Calder’s “For Teachers 
to Live, Professors Must Die” presented at Baylor University’s 
Christianity and the Soul of the University conference in 2004. 
Calder powerfully applies to classrooms the claim from the 
Gospel of John that “unless a grain of wheat falls into the ground 
and dies, it remains alone; but if it dies it bears much fruit.” 
But it isn’t the case that just telling people how to live 
Christianity (or religion) tells people how to teach. The very 
act of asking what religion has to do with what goes on in our 
schools can move us to analysis of our pedagogical aspirations 
and methods. The most substantive and illuminating public 
discussion of teaching I have ever been in at Luther College was 
just a month or so ago, and it wasn’t in a workshop on pedagogy. 
It occurred among a group of second-year faculty from a wide 
range of disciplines and religious perspectives, convened for a 
workshop on the mission of the college and on what we tend to 
call “the dialogue between faith and learning.” Talking about 
the interactions of persons with widely varying fundamental 
commitments in our institution led us directly—and repeat-
edly—to the central questions of what we seek to accomplish 
in our classrooms, and what means and methods will make it 
happen. This is a specific way in which our institutional commit-
ment to questions of religious identity invigorates and enhances 
our academic work and aspirations.
The example of Luther College’s faith and learning discus-
sions (with the reader’s indulgence) will also serve to introduce 
one way in which religious identity can enhance what I’ve 
labeled institutional or curricular virtues. In the course of our 
wide-ranging discussion about the meaning and implications 
of the Lutheran academic tradition, contributions by workshop 
members were often prefaced by phrases like “As a biologist 
I...” or “In Social Work we...” or “historians sometimes...” The 
idea here is that the nature of the conversation not only elicited 
varying disciplinary perspectives on a common idea, but also 
required the articulation of what that disciplinary perspective 
consists of and how, to some extent, it works internally. The 
fact that such articulation is necessary even among faculty and 
that opportunity for conversation that requires it is increas-
ingly rare reflects increasing fragmentation along disciplinary 
lines in higher education. In their Devil’s Dictionary for Higher 
Education, Cary Nelson and Stephen Watt have labeled the 
extremes of this trend as “entrepreneurial disciplinarity,” a cir-
cumstance which despairs of identifying any common mission 
even within disciplines. Of the many ways in which liberal arts 
colleges might emulate the habits of faculty-producing research 
universities, surely this is one of the more pernicious.
The discussion in our faculty workshop on faith and learning 
illustrates a more general principle. Institutional religious commit-
ment or identity serves the academic goals of learning communities 
by inviting—or provoking—conversation across disciplines, and 
providing a framework for integrating disciplinary pursuits and 
perspectives. Insofar as the core claims of the institution’s religious 
tradition cut across disciplinary lines, and insofar as those claims 
are taken seriously, they provide a set of questions serving as inte-
gration or contact points for the various elements of an academic 
course of study. (These core claims or questions serve this academic 
function for all members of the academic community—whether 
individually within the affiliated religious tradition or not.)
“Institutional commitment to questions 
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the programmatic approach of chapels, chaplains, and spiritual 
emphasis weeks—commendable and important though they 
may be—falls short, in my judgment.
I turn instead to the incarnational expressions of faith and 
piety. What I found most effective during my intellectual and 
spiritual development in college was the example of my mentors. 
These were women and men of deep and abiding faith who were 
also manifestly human. They were unafraid to question their 
faith or to express their doubts, but the best of them also mod-
eled for me a piety that found expression not only in declara-
tions of belief but in sincere intellectual engagement and lives of 
integrity. They were my teachers in the fullest sense of the word. 
Their example impressed me deeply and affected me profoundly, 
and I maintain my friendships with many of these mentors to 
this day, thirty years after graduation.
Aside from the twin perils of secularity, which manifests 
itself in intellectualism, and sectarianism, which posits a kind of 
alternate academic universe, the final peril of Christian higher 
education is insularity. Shirley Nelson’s troubling novel, The Last 
Year of the War, a thinly fictionalized account of student life at 
Moody Bible Institute, illustrates this copiously, and although 
I’m certainly aware of the differences between Bible schools and 
Christian liberal arts colleges, I think Nelson’s novel is certainly 
worth reading. I recall that I seldom read a newspaper while I was 
in college, and I had little interaction with the larger world during 
the academic year, aside from my jobs in the community. Add to 
that the homogeneity that tends very often to afflict these schools, 
and the problem of insularity becomes acute.
I ran across an extreme example of this during my visit 
to Patrick Henry College last December. Patrick Henry was 
founded in 2000 by Michael Farris to provide a place where 
parents who home-schooled their children could secure a col-
lege education free from such alien influences as feminism or 
Darwinism, a place where, in effect, parents could rest assured 
that their children would never encounter an idea that the 
parents would find objectionable or even questionable. The 
school’s website (www.phc.edu), for example, informs parents 
that all “biology, Bible or other courses at PHC dealing with 
creation will teach creation from the understanding of Scripture 
that God’s creative work, as described in Genesis 1:1-31, was 
completed in six twenty-four hour days.” Students who attend 
Patrick Henry College, moreover, pledge to “reserve sexual activ-
ity for the sanctity of marriage” and promise to “seek and obtain 
parental permission when pursuing a romantic relationship.”
Patrick Henry, as I said, is an extreme example of insularity, 
but the unfortunate corollary is that Patrick Henry College 
also aspires to train America’s leaders for the twenty-first 
century. Michael Farris, the founder and now the chancellor 
of the school, told the New York Times that the sentiment he 
hears most often from parents is that I want my kid to be on the 
Supreme Court someday. Farris added that, if we get enough 
kids into the “farm system,” that will happen. Since 2002, 
Patrick Henry College, a school with an enrollment of only 
two hundred, has placed twenty-four of its students as White 
House interns; a larger number have served internships in other 
governmental agencies and on the Congressional staffs of elected 
officials sympathetic to the Religious Right.
These are the people who aspire to lead the United States, 
this gorgeously pluralistic nation, in the twenty-first century. 
Because of their home-schooling and their experience at Patrick 
Henry College, these students most likely have never had any 
sustained or significant interaction with anyone outside of their 
own cohort of white, middle-class evangelicals. Because of the 
insular nature of their upbringing and their undergraduate 
education, they have never encountered an idea or an argu-
ment—feminism, for instance, or civil rights for lesbians and 
gays or Darwinism or environmentalism—except in caricature. 
As I ask in Thy Kingdom Come, I wonder how many graduates 
of Patrick Henry College have ever read Das Kapital or The 
Feminine Mystique or Fast Food Nation or Catcher in the Rye 
or The Autobiography of Malcolm X. How many of them have 
watched the “Eyes on the Prize” documentary or “The Future of 
Food” or “What Happened to the Electric Car?” What goes on 
at Patrick Henry is not so much education as indoctrination.
I emphasize (a second time) that Patrick Henry College is an 
extreme example of insularity, but it points to a real danger faced 
by institutions of Christian higher education. Instead of a hot 
house, I prefer to think of Christian liberal arts colleges as halfway 
houses, a place where students reared in a religious subculture can 
begin to interact with the wider world. They experiment with 
new ideas and try on new personas (which, of course, is the task 
of every adolescent). They interact with the larger culture not by 
plunging directly into the sea of pluralism and secularity, but by 
means of tentative forays—dipping a toe in the water, teasing the 
waves, and then maybe a few dog paddles into the current, but 
never far from a mentor navigating the same waters.
This is my vision for Christian higher education, a venue 
where students thoroughly grounded in the religion of their 
parents can begin to interact with the world outside of their own 
“The final peril of Christian higher 
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subculture—not from a posture of fear or defensiveness, though 
some of that is inevitable, but from a position of strength and 
curiosity and engagement. Are there risks inherent in such a 
strategy? Of course there are, and we all have stories of those 
who have lost their faith in the process. But my experience, not 
to mention my theology, tells me that we have to trust the pro-
cess and, more important, trust that Jesus will ultimately gather 
his children unto himself.
If I am right that Christian liberal arts colleges represent a 
good place to make an effective transition from the subculture 
to the larger world, one key component for that transition is 
exposure to pluralism and the avoidance of insularity. How to 
do that?  Admissions officers, in my experience, make a good-
faith effort to recruit students beyond the usual cohort, but the 
competition for qualified students of color is often fierce. But 
there are other ways to combat insularity and to expose students 
to the universe beyond their subculture. 
In a perfect world, one with unlimited resources, I’d start 
by providing every student with a daily subscription to the 
New York Times—not because the New York Times is perfect 
or inerrant, but because it opens a window to the larger world 
and it instills the importance of becoming conversant with 
developments beyond the campus. I’d encourage faculty to 
expose students to ideas other than those sanctioned by the 
religious subculture—and to do so with primary sources 
rather than through the lens of secondary treatments. 
Internships are also effective (Patrick Henry College is right 
about that), but let’s encourage students to think creatively 
about their activities outside of campus. Non-profit (and 
non-religious) agencies, environmental networks, political 
campaigns, local government, hospice, councils of churches, 
interfaith agencies—all of these expose students to people and 
ideas beyond their own subculture.
And it’s time also to think more creatively about the mean-
ing of pluralism. Not only African Americans, for example, but 
Hispanic Americans and Native Americans and South Asians 
and people of different ethnic backgrounds. Diversity comes 
in many colors, creeds, and ages. I would love to see Christian 
liberal arts colleges construct condominiums and townhouses 
for retirees on or adjacent to their campuses. Invite seniors to 
participate fully in campus life, to attend classes and athletic 
and cultural events, and interact with students in the dining 
halls. And can you imagine the volunteer work force they would 
contribute to the campus? One of the real scandals of American 
society is the way we warehouse the elderly in nursing homes 
and neglect them, rather than draw on their experience and 
wisdom. And, who knows, maybe one of the students will one 
day point us to a better way of treating our elders.
I have no regrets whatsoever for choosing the path that 
led me to a Christian liberal arts college all those years ago. 
My undergraduate education shaped me in important ways 
by exposing me gradually to a larger world that I never would 
have encountered had I remained sequestered in my religious 
subculture—or certainly would have encountered on very dif-
ferent terms. I’m grateful for that. I’m grateful for the example 
of my mentors, fellow-travelers in the enterprise of sustaining 
the faith in an environment that all too frequently is hostile to 
faith. The whole experience of baccalaureate studies made my 
faith stronger and more resilient, but it also ensured that I could 
never again hide my light under a bushel or burrow back into 
the insularity of the subculture.
I function today as a person of faith in a pluralistic context. As 
such, I simultaneously inhabit two worlds, and I embrace them 
both—sometimes with fear and trembling, but more often with 
gusto and enthusiasm. I wouldn’t have it any other way.
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I WOULD BE PLEASED to discover that my approach to 
the question of “Lutheran Identity and Academic Integrity” 
is shaped by an outdated concern. I am concerned about 
the assumption that religious commitment in general—and 
Christian commitment in particular—threatens purely aca-
demic aspirations. If this is no longer the dominant view in 
American higher education, that fact is very good news. Even 
so, some—perhaps some few—continue to suppose that, when 
it comes to religious identity and academic integrity, the only 
real question is which one will give way to the other. I want to 
say that neither has to give way to the other. In fact, I want to say 
more than that. If we are past the point where people say “that 
can’t be a good school because it’s religious,” another sentiment 
may still be common: “that’s a pretty good school in spite of 
being religious.” I propose to emphasize ways in which Lutheran 
identity might promote our academic aspirations; that is to say, I 
want to suggest the possibility that someone might say “that’s a 
pretty good school because it’s religious.”
In suggesting this possibility, I’ll mention three kinds of 
considerations: academic virtues, institutional or curricular 
virtues, and the matter of academic freedom. In spite of the fact 
that religious (or Christian, or Lutheran) colleges and universi-
ties have not always exhibited excellence in these areas, not only 
can they do so, but they can do so for emphatically religious 
(or Christian, or Lutheran) reasons. I will try to make this case 
fairly quickly, because even if it is persuasive, questions should 
remain about the third aspect of my professed topic (and the 
emphasis of this conference): diversity. I will focus on religious 
diversity because it may seem most out of line with the argument 
so far proposed. After all, if whatever we are up to is a substan-
tively Lutheran mission, doesn’t it stand to reason that we need 
Lutherans to pull it off, and that Lutherans are the ones who 
will enjoy the fruits of it? I don’t think so. Actually, what I think 
is that we don’t need only Lutherans. I will argue in the conclud-
ing discussion of religious diversity that the people who can say 
“that’s a pretty good school because it’s Lutheran or Christian” 
don’t have to be Lutheran or Christian to say it—if it’s true.
Academic Integrity: Academic and Curricular Virtues
Recent critiques of Enlightenment ideals such as individualism, 
objectivity and certainty have carried over to academic practices 
and institutions which bear the stamp of those ideals, and I should 
confess at the outset that I do not side wholeheartedly with crit-
ics of the Enlightenment academy. Nevertheless, even if one is 
enamored of individualism, the communal nature of learning and 
the pursuit of knowledge is undeniable. Further, no matter how 
significant the ideals of objectivity and certainty may be, it must 
be regarded as folly to ignore the limits of finite (and interested) 
reason—bound by perspective even if reality is not. Since this is 
the case, the academic enterprise—learning, research, teaching—
requires communities in which the virtues of humility, hospitality 
and charity (to name but a few) are deeply ingrained. Christian 
communities are not the only ones in which these virtues ought to 
flourish, but they should be exemplary ones.
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